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FROM TRAITOR TO MARTYR: DRAWING LESSONS
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1944*
Abstract
Based on recently reopened files and publications in Nanjing, as well as published and newsreel
accounts from the 1940s, this paper represents the first scholarly analysis of the rituals surrounding
the death and burial of Wang Jingwei in Japanese-occupied China. Rather than locating this anal-
ysis purely in the literature on the history of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), however,
this paper asks what Wang Jingwei’s Re-organized National Government might tell us about per-
sonality cults in the political culture of modern China. While Wang’s burial drew heavily on the
precedent of Sun Yat-sen’s funerals of the 1920s, it also presaged later spectacles of public mourn-
ing and posthumous commemoration, such as Chiang Kai-shek’s funeral in 1975 in Taipei. In
focusing on this one specific event in the life of a “puppet government,” this paper hopes to reignite
scholarly interest in the study of “dead leaders” and their posthumous lives in modern Chinese
history more generally.
INTRODUCTION
Despite the flurry of commemorative events in China in the months leading up to the sev-
entieth anniversary of the “Victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against
Japanese Aggression and theWorld Anti-Fascist War,” not every major event in that con-
flict was publicly remembered. The seventieth anniversary of the death of one of China’s
most officially loathed wartime “collaborators”—Wang Jingwei汪精衛 (1883–1944)—
passed virtually without mention on November 10, 2014. This was consistent with the
approach adopted in China throughout the following twelve months, with Wang and
other “traitors to the Chinese nation” (Hanjian 漢奸) being not so much condemned
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as simply ignored. In contrast to speeches made by PRC dignitaries at the fiftieth anni-
versary twenty years earlier,1 Xi Jinping’s 习近平 (1953–) September 3, 2015 speech,
delivered within sight of the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall on Tiananmen Square,
barely even hinted at “collaboration.”2 In the extended festival to the memory of
Chinese resistance,Wang Jingwei remained verymuch the proverbial “ghost at the feast.”3
To be sure, “collaboration” has emerged as a much-debated field in modern Chinese
history in recent years, even if such developments are yet to filter into public debate. His-
torians such as Timothy Brook and Margherita Zanasi have reinvigorated intellectual
interest in the topic following an initial wave of writing about it in the 1970s.4 Such
work has opened up exciting new possibilities, and has prompted historians to move
beyond earlier fascination in the political intrigues of Wang’s “Peace Movement”
(heping yundong和平運動) which were once such a dominant thread in the scholarship.5
Despite such advances, however, we still know relatively little about various aspects of
Wang Jingwei’s Re-organized National Government (RNG), especially when it comes to
that regime’s political culture. So cynical was earlier scholarship about Wang’s wartime
administration—influenced, in particular, by the Cai Dejin蔡德金 “freak of history” par-
adigm, which posited that the RNG represented an aberration in the teleological narrative
of Chinese political history, and the march towards 19496—that general works on the
wartime experience still tend to pass over the RNG as little more than an “historical
dead end.”7 Indeed, for some theorists, the morally compromised nature of the regime
is something that can never be separated from its study.8 As a result, when it comes to
the RNG,we have nothing comparable with the body of work that now explains the political
1Chang Jui-te, “The Politics of Commemoration: A Comparative Analysis of the Fiftieth-Anniversary Com-
memoration in Mainland China and Taiwan of the Victory in the Anti-Japanese War,” in Scars of War: The
Impact of Warfare on Modern China, edited by Diana Lary and Stephen MacKinnon (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2001), 136–60. As Chang notes, Li Peng李鹏 made reference to wartime collaboration in September 1995 as
a means of attacking the Taiwan independence movement: “History repeatedly demonstrates that anyone who
tries to lean on foreigners to divide and betray the mother country will be thoroughly discredited,” 139.
2For the full text of this speech (in English translation) see, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-pol-
itics/article/1854943/full-text-xi-jinping-military-parade-speech-vows-china.
3For an account of the September 3 celebrations in Beijing, see John Delury, Sheila A. Smith, Maria Repni-
kova, and Srinath Raghavan, “Looking Back on the Seventieth Anniversary of Japan’s Surrender,” Journal of
Asian Studies 74.4 (November 2015): 797–820.
4Timothy Brook, Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2007); Margherita Zanasi, Saving the Nation: Economic Modernity in Republican
China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). The classic work from the 1970s is John Hunter Boyle,
China and Japan at War, 1937–1945: The Politics of Collaboration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972).
5This is true of the literature in both Chinese and English. For an example of Wang-era “intrigue” literature
in Chinese, see Sha Ping沙平, “Wang Jingwei si yin zhi mi”汪精卫死因之谜 (The secrets behind the cause of
Wang Jingwei’s death), Dang’an tiandi (April 2007): 14–18; for an example of similar scholarship in English,
see Joseph Yick, “Communist-puppet Collaboration in Japanese-occupied China: Pan Hannian and Li Shiqun,
1939–1943,” Intelligence and National Security 16.4 (2001): 61–88.
6Cai Dejin 蔡德金, Lishi de guaitai: Wang Jingwei guomin zhengfu 历史的怪胎 ：汪精卫国民政府
(Freak of history: TheWang Jingwei National Government) (Guilin: Guangxi Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 1993).
7For a recent example, see Rana Mitter, China’s War with Japan, 1937–1945: The Struggle for Survival
(London: Allen Lane, 2013), 370.
8The debate on this is best summed up in Timothy Brook, “Hesitating before the Judgment of History,”
Journal of Asian Studies 71.1 (February 2012): 103–14.
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culture ofMao’s China,9 and there are few authoritative accounts of even themost important
ritual or symbolic events in this regime’s history. In John Hunter Boyle’s much cited 300-
page account of the RNG, for instance, only two pages are dedicated to one of the most
seminal events in this regime’s history, i.e., Wang Jingwei’s burial in November 1944.10
Why should we care about an obscure, short-lived entity like the RNG? While one
entirely justified response to this question might be to refer to gaps in the study of
wartime China, I would like to suggest in this paper that the RNG is significant in two
more far-reaching ways. Firstly, in this regime we find a set of rituals, icons, and narra-
tives which enables us to test theories that have emerged out of the rich literature on polit-
ical culture in modern China. This ranges from studies of personality cults, to state
attempts at controlling and managing the physical, ideological, and even spiritual
legacy of deceased leaders in diverse forms of Chinese nationalism. If, for example, as
Henrietta Harrison has suggested, “during the Republican period the death of a political
figure was a crucial moment for defining his subsequent image,” then howmight we start
explaining both the similarities and the marked differences between the “subsequent
images” which developed of a dead Sun Yat-sen 孫中山 (the topic of Harrison’s
study) and other leaders who emerged from the same Republican tradition, such as
Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石, or the subject of this paper—Wang Jingwei?11 Similarly, if
as Rebecca Nedostup has perceptively noted, one of the perennial problems of modern
Chinese statehood has been the statist impulse to promote nominally secular nationalism
while managing the residua of popular religion—manifest in contestation over commem-
oration of martyrs, heroes, and “fathers of the nation”—then how do ensuing debates play
out in the context of rival regimes which seek to own the Republican mantle?12 And why
is it that so many twentieth century leaders in China appear to have developed what some
scholars have referred to as a “founding emperor complex,” while anticipating their own
posthumous reputations by manufacturing symbolic links with predecessors drawn from
the annals of Chinese history?13Wang Jingwei’s death, in other words, provides us with a
hitherto largely ignored event against which we can test some of these theories and ideas.
In spite of shared Republican political traditions, however, we must also acknowledge
that the RNG’s very existence was based on the specific context of wartime “collabora-
tion” with the Japanese. In this regard, then, the commemoration of Wang’s death also
allows us to test scholarly hypotheses regarding the nature of Chinese “client states”
under occupation.14 What can Wang’s death and the subsequent events surrounding
9Such as that found in Chang-tai Hung,Mao’s NewWorld: Political Culture in the Early People’s Republic
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).
10Boyle, China and Japan at War, 322–23.
11Henrietta Harrison, The Making of the Republican Citizen: Political Ceremonies and Symbols in China,
1911–1929 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 134.
12Rebecca Nedostup, Superstitious Regimes: Religion and the Politics of Chinese Modernity (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), 280.
13Geremie R. Barmé, “For Truly Great Men, Look to This Age Alone: Was Mao a New Emperor?,” in
A Critical Introduction to Mao, edited by Timothy Cheek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
243–72.
14Major examples of which are found in collections such as David P. Barrett and Larry Shyu, eds., Chinese
Collaboration with Japan, 1932–1945: The Limits of Accommodation (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2002).
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his burial and commemoration tell us about the RNG’s own mortality, for example? And
given that Wang was so symbolically central to this regime and its limited legitimacy,
was a post-Wang RNG ever possible?
Drawing on official and archival accounts of Wang Jingwei’s death, such as those in
the recently reopened Second Historical Archives in Nanjing, as well as contemporary
accounts published in the occupation media, this paper thus seeks not to merely reiterate
the now familiar call to take the RNG seriously in the story of wartime China. Instead, its
aim is to place Wang Jingwei’s version of Republican nationalism back into the land-
scape of Chinese political culture, and especially the study of Chinese leadership cults.
It will do this by analyzing the very event that went unmentioned in November 2014
—the death of Wang Jingwei. Wang’s death did not simply mark the “beginning of
the end” for the RNG. It also represented the culmination of years of hagiographic inno-
vation under occupation, and brought to the fore questions of how best to use Republican
ritual precedents when burying a leader whose posthumous fate was already subject to
Resistance vitriol. Therefore, while acknowledging that the context of occupation
shaped the regime that Wang led, this study also suggests that there was much in the
RNG’s burial of its leader that suggested similarities and parallels with other regimes
across China’s complicated twentieth century, and that this event can shed unexpected
light on a nascent field we might call “Chinese dead leader studies.”15
Pe r s o n a l i t y c u l t s u n d e r o c c u p a t i o n
As a number of earlier forays have suggested, the RNG shared much in common with the
regime it claimed to be replacing when it “returned to the capital” (huandu 還都) of
Nanjing in the spring of 1940. This was especially so in terms of political culture.16
The RNG inherited the personality cult that had been constructed around the figure of
Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) in the 1920s and 1930s (and which Wang Jingwei himself
had played a major role in building). Under the RNG, official reverence for the Republic
of China’s nominal founder was amplified far beyond pre-war levels. The RNG’s raison
d’être became tied to the figure of Sun in that Wang Jingwei’s leadership was invariably
justified by the personal connections he had developed with Sun in earlier decades.17 It
was Wang who had been at Sun’s deathbed in 1925, and who had drafted Sun’s last will
and testament—“the object of almost religious veneration during the Nationalist Party’s
later cult of Sun.”18 Little wonder then that RNG editions of Sun’s writings, produced
alongside copies of Wang’s own collected speeches and essays, were regularly published
with prefaces in Wang’s name in this period.19
15This is a point to which I shall return (with reference to the relevant literature) in the conclusion.
16See, for example, David P. Barrett, “The Wang Jingwei Regime, 1940–1945: Continuities and Disjunc-
tures with Nationalist China,” in Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932–1945: The Limits of Accommoda-
tion, edited by David P. Barrett and Larry Shyu (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 102–15.
17Jeremy E. Taylor, “Republican Personality Cults in Wartime China: Contradistinction and Collabora-
tion,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 57.3 (July 2015): 665–93.
18Harrison, Making of the Republican Citizen, 136.
19Including those produced for an international market. A new English-language edition of Sun’s Three
Principles of the People三民主義, with a preface in Wang’s name, was published in January 1943 by the Min-
istry of Publicity, for example (possibly to coincide with the RNG’s declaration of war on the Allies that same
4 Jeremy E. Taylor
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In founding its capital in Nanjing, and thereby taking on stewardship of Sun’s body,
the RNG also claimed legitimacy as the inheritor of the Nationalist project. Indeed, pos-
session of both Sun and the place in which his remains were kept represented a major
component of what some scholars have referred to as RNG “collaborationist national-
ism.”20 The regime went to great lengths to promote such nationalism in official propa-
ganda, with the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum (Zhongshanling 中山陵) becoming the
regime’s single most important landmark. One of the first public (and most photo-
graphed) of acts that Wang Jingwei undertook upon “returning” to Nanjing in March
1940, for example, was to pay an official visit to this mausoleum. This site was embel-
lished under the RNG, particularly following the start of the “New Citizens Movement”
(Xin guomin yundong新國民運動) in 1942, with the regime putting in place new reg-
ulations governing public behavior in its vicinity,21 while continuing with many of the
prewar practices surrounding it, such as its greening through mass tree-planting cam-
paigns.22 Annual commemoration of Sun’s birth and death at the mausoleum sat along-
side the Republic’s National Day (October 10) as some of the most important dates on the
RNG calendar.
If worship of Sun’s body in the mausoleum which housed it emerged as an important
ritual practice in the RNG, then so too did worship of revolutionary martyrs, for the RNG
inherited the most important cemeteries of the Republican movement, including the
National Revolutionary Army Cemetery (國民革命軍陣亡將士公墓) in Nanjing, and
the Huanghuagang 黃花崗 site in Guangzhou, where the “Seventy-two martyrs” of a
failed 1911 uprising against the Qing Dynasty had been commemorated since the
1920s.23 The Huanghuagang site became a major ritual center for this regime, with the
commemoration of Republican martyrs there conflated with the celebration of
Pan-Asian unity, and dignitaries from other countries within the “Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere” visiting it regularly after 1943.24 To this pre-war pantheon of
dead Republican revolutionaries, however, the RNG also added its own “martyrs who
had died bringing about peace” (heyun xianlie 和運先烈)—i.e., those who had lost
their lives working for the “Peace Movement” prior to the RNG’s formal inauguration
month). Xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao 宣傳部工作報告, January 1943. Second Historical Archives
(Nanjing): 2003-1-2034.
20On collaborationist nationalism and ownership of Sun’s physical remains, see Margherita Zanasi,
“Globalizing Hanjian: The Suzhou Trials and the Post-World War II Discourse on Collaboration,” American
Historical Review 113.3 (2008): 731–51.
21On new regulations drafted in 1943 by the New Citizens Movement Committee (Xin guomin yundong
weiyuanhui) governing modes of dress and behavior at the mausoleum, see Second Historical Archives
(Nanjing): 2003-1-2082.
22Shoudu zaolin yundong jinian kan首都造林運動紀念刊 (Special commemorative issue on the capital
forestry campaign) (Nanjing: Nanjing tebie shi zhengfu, 1941). The RNG’s “forestry campaign” around the
mausoleum was officially inaugurated on the 16th anniversary of Sun’s death.
23Shuk-wah Poon,Negotiating Religion in Modern China: State and Common People in Guangzhou (Hong
Kong: The ChineseUniversity Press, 2011), 7. See also Virgil Ho, “Martyrs of Ghosts? A Short Cultural History
of a Tomb in Revolutionary Canton, 1911–1970,” East Asian History 27 (June 2004): 99–138.
24Images of foreign dignitaries (e.g., from the Indian National Army) paying their respects at the site are
included in “Guangdongsheng Da Dongya qingnian dahui”廣東省大東亞青年大會 (The Greater East Asia
Youth Convention in Guangdong), Dong Ya lianmeng huabao (The Toa Pictorial) 3.11 (December 1943):
no page numbers.
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in spring 1940.25 Such martyrs were granted their own annual memorial day (September
1), which symbolically placed them alongside martyrs who had died pursuing earlier rev-
olutionary activities (the latter being commemorated with a public holiday every March
29).26 In this regard, Wang’s regime was little different from Chiang Kai-shek’s Nation-
alists. Both administrations recognized the significance of “ennobling the stature of ded-
icated war heroes” at a time of unprecedented disruption, and it is worth noting that the
codification of specific “martyrs’ shrines” (zhonglieci忠烈祠) by Chiang’s Nationalists
only started in the months immediately preceding the founding of the RNG.27
Wang Jingwei’s own legitimacy was also directly linked to Republican notions of mar-
tyrdom, for the hagiographical writing that emerged under the RNG through agencies
such as the Ministry of Publicity (Xuanchuanbu 宣傳部) weaved stories of Wang’s
exploits as a young revolutionary into narratives about him. As Zhiyi Yang has convinc-
ingly argued, for example, “Wang consistently portray[ed] himself as a martyr and a
romantic figure who was ready to sacrifice not just his life, but even his posthumous rep-
utation, for the salvation of the nation” during wartime.28 Yang’s study focuses almost
exclusively on how this was achieved through poetry, but as we shall see below, the pre-
sentation of Wang as a martyr went far beyond literature. Indeed, it became central to the
RNG project itself, and after 1944, would come to be expressed in ritual and even in
funerary architecture.
Wang Jingwei was fortunate to have lived until the age of sixty-two. He had survived
two assassination attempts earlier in life. These were both widely reported, and in the aca-
demic literature they are often deemed to have influenced the subsequent political
choices he made.29 The first, a November 1935 shooting at a Central Executive Commit-
tee meeting of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in Beijing, provided a series of
graphic images of an injured Wang in hospital which would be widely circulated for
the rest of his career. The second, a 1939 shooting in Hanoi which would leave
Wang’s close personal friend Zeng Zhongming曾仲鳴 dead, was not visually recorded.
It was arguably more important, however, for it is often credited as leading to Wang’s
ultimate decision to work with the Japanese towards a negotiated peace.30
Throughout the war, the physical consequences of these attempts on Wang’s life
would have implications for his health, as well as for the personal narrative that his cour-
tiers manufactured to legitimize his rule. Indeed, his ultimate death in 1944 to multiple
25Zhongguo canzhan yi lai dashi xiezhen zhuanji中國參戰以來大事寫真專輯 (An album of photographs
of major events in China since the [RNG’s] declaration of war [on the allies]) (Nanjing: Zhongyang Dia-
nxunshe, 1944), 82.
26Guomin li國民曆 (Citizens’ calendar) (Nanjing: Xingzhengyuan Jiaoyubu, 1941), 98–100.
27Rebecca Nedostup, “Burying, Repatriating, and Leaving the Dead in Wartime and Postwar China and
Taiwan, 1937–1955,” Journal of Chinese History 1 (2017): 111–39 (esp. 115–16). Though it lies beyond
the scope of this paper, future studies may go further in determining any causal link between the commemora-
tion of martyrs in occupied Nanjing and in unoccupied Chongqing at this point in the war.
28Zhiyi Yang, “The Road to Lyric Martyrdom: Reading the Poetry of Wang Zhaoming (1883–1944),”
Chinese Literature: Essays, Articles, Reviews 37 (2015): 136.
29See, for example, Jianyue Chen, “Chen Gongbo: A National Collaborator or a Collaborationist National-
ist? A Case Study of Chinese Wartime Collaborationism,” The Chinese Historical Review 13.2 (2006): 300.
30Such as Gerald E. Bunker, The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China War, 1937–1941
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 131–36.
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myeloma was presented by the RNG as being directly related to bullet fragments in
Wang’s back sustained during the 1935 attack.31 When Wang underwent surgery in
Japan in early 1944 to remove the shrapnel, the operation was widely reported on in occu-
pied China, with images of the procedure being printed in the press.32 The 1939 attempt
on Wang’s life, while leaving Wang with no lasting injuries, was also observed. Zeng
Zhongming, who had died in that attack, was raised to the level of “martyr” by the
RNG, and the date of his death in Hanoi (i.e., the date that Wang Jingwei had been
almost killed) was marked annually by broadcasts and public events, thus regularly
reminding citizens of Wang’s close escape.33
The RNG thus did not try to denyWang’s near-death experiences; nor, however, did it
present his survival of them as representative of any superhuman powers or divine pro-
tection. Rather, this regime embraced an image of Wang which was open to his corporeal
fragility, and which stressed his willingness to embrace death for the sake of the country.
Indeed, in some RNG interpretations, Buddhist allusions were used to stress the nature of
Wang’s personal sacrifice. “Throughout his whole life,” wrote the RNG hagiographer
cum bibliophile Zhang Jiangcai張江裁 (1908–68) in 1943:
MrWang has not hesitated to followmany difficult paths so that the masses might prosper. He
has thrown his own body to hungry tigers, not only giving up his life, but also his reputation.
One could even call him a Bodhisattva….34
Such imagery must be understood within broader policies under the RNG to promote
Buddhism as a shared Sino-Japanese religion which might promote “peace” across
Asia.35 Yet such musings had far deeper significance, for they helped sustain the
notion that Wang was willing to put himself through pain and discomfort for his
country, even at the expense of his own physical longevity. To cite one of the most
common RNG phrases, Wang needed to be “protected” (yonghu 擁護), while at the
same time acknowledging that he was destined to one day die for his nation.
Admissions of corporeal fragility could only be permitted up to a point, however. And
while it was within “Peace Movement” parameters to present Wang as a physical victim
(and hence as an analog of occupied China itself), it was quite another thing to hint that
such fragility undermined Wang’s ability to govern. Ministry of Publicity reports from
1944 are littered with evidence of anxiety about how Wang’s ailing health that year
might be relayed to the Chinese public. When, in February 1944, German journalists
31Mayumi Itoh, The Making of China’s War with Japan: Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 97.
32
“Wang zhuxi banian qian liudan, anran quchu”汪主席八年前留彈安然取出 (A bullet left in Chairman
Wang eight years ago is safely extracted), Zhonghua huabao 2.1 (February 1944): 2–3.
33Later in the war, as Wang’s health deteriorated, Wang’s rivals in Chongqing attempted to spread rumors
that the real cause of Wang’s maladies were two further assassination attempts during the war, this time at the
hands of his own guards. According to this theory, it was the second such attempt which necessitated his
removal to Japan for medical treatment in the spring of 1944. The National Archives (London): WO 208/181.
34Zhang Jiangcai 張江裁, Wang Jingwei xiansheng xingshilu 汪精衛先生行事錄 (A true record of Mr
Wang Jingwei’s activities) (Dongguan: Baiyuantang, 1943), 8.
35On this, see Benjamin Brose, “Resurrecting Xuan Zang: The Modern Travels of a Medieval Monk,”
in Recovering Buddhism in Modern China, edited by Jan Kiely and J. Brooks Jessup (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2016).
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in Nanjing reported on a speech by Wang in which he was reported to have said “I have
asked Chen Gongbo to host this event on my behalf due to the fact that I have not fully
recovered from an illness,”RNG censors set to work redacting references in the transcript
to Wang’s ill health.36 Three months later—and perhaps as a means of redeeming earlier
indiscretions—the RNG requested that Germany’s Trans-ocean News Service (a major
presence in the occupation media)37 distribute news ofWang’s apparent recovery follow-
ing his operation.38 As Wang’s health deteriorated, news of his physical condition in the
RNG media grew scant, though this almost certainly reflected the wishes of Wang’s
minders, for Japanese authorities did not allow Wang to be visited by journalists
during the remainder of his stay there.39
Moreover, for RNG cadres, fragility was not synonymous with atrophy. A recurrent
theme in regime propaganda, for example, was Wang’s perpetual youth.40 From the
time of his reinvention by the “Peace Movement” and its Japanese backers in 1939,
Wang was said to be “forever a youth.” (yongyuan de qingnian 永遠的青年)41
Indeed, hagiographic depictions of Wang by RNG cadres—such as this one recounting
a 1941 meeting with Wang penned by a regime journalist—invariably mentioned his
“youthful appearance”:
He [i.e., Wang] wore a suit, and looked radiant (shencai yiyi 神采奕奕).With that kind
demeanor and amiable smile of his, he always looked like a youth, and always treated his
guests with honesty.42
Wang was also closely associated with the RNG’s “New Citizens Movement”—a
campaign which conflated adulation of Wang and Sun with the mass mobilization of
youth groups (qingshaonian tuan 青少年團).43 Wang was the nominal head of this
campaign, and as historians such as Jing Shenghong经盛鸿 have suggested, he was pre-
sented through it as the natural leader of China’s next generation.44
References to youth also took on a distinct temporal focus in biographical writing
about Wang. One of the most important points in Wang’s life, as presented in RNG hagi-
ography, was his unsuccessful attempt in 1910 to kill theManchu Prince Regent Zai Feng
載灃 (1883–1951) with explosives. Indeed, entire books were written about the episode
36Xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao, February 1944. Second Historical Archives (Nanjing): 2003-1-2034.
37Heidi Tworek, “Magic Connections: German News Agencies and Global News Networks, 1905–1945,”
Enterprise and Society 15.4 (December 2014): 672–686.
38Xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao, May 1944. Second Historical Archives (Nanjing): 2003-1-2033.
39Bunker, Peace Conspiracy, 280.
40The classic written expression of this cult can be found in Anon.,Women de lingxiu, Wang Zhuxi我們的
領袖：汪主席 (Our leader Chairman Wang) (Nanjing: Nanjing tebie shi zhengfu xuanchuanchu, 1942).
41
“Tingshen fenqi heping jiuguo de Wang Zhaoming” 挺身奮起和平救國的汪兆銘 (Wang Zhaoming,
who stands up for the struggle and saves the nation through peace),Huawen Daban meiri (Kabun Osaka Main-
ichi) 3.5 (September 1939): 4.
42Women de lingxiu, Wang Zhuxi, 4.
43Indeed, at youth camps held under the movement, members were required to partake in public exhorta-
tions of support for Wang while engaging in physical fitness routines. “Wang Wei xin guomin yundong
diyijie qingshaonian tuan shuqi jixun ying xunlian gangyao, deng.” 汪偽新國民運動第一屆青少年團暑期
集訓營訓練綱要等 Second Historical Archives (Nanjing): 2003-1-2092.
44Jing Shenghong 经盛鸿, Nanjing lunxian banian shi (xia) 南京沦陷八年史（下） (The eight year
history of Nanjing’s occupation, Part II) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2013), 797.
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under the RNG.45 Wang was therefore not only the ideal leader of occupied China’s
youth, but had himself been an idealistic, young revolutionary. Indeed, the story of the
1910 plot worked perfectly to tie RNG representations of Wang the selfless martyr
with “young Wang,” for his arrest immediately following the plot had very nearly led
to Wang’s execution by the Qing court.46
Such hagiographic innovations need to be understood in the context of a rhetorical
struggle between Nanjing and Chongqing during the war years for what the news
media today refers to as “control of the narrative.” The RNG was working not simply
to project specific visions of Wang (e.g., as a youth or a martyr—or both), but also to
counter attacks on Wang by his enemies in China’s Nationalist-led Resistance. While
the physical protection of Wang against any further assassination attempts was a priority
for RNG defense officials, protecting him against the figurative death that the Resistance
willed upon him was also important.47 In what was, by the outbreak of war, a well-estab-
lished Chinese political tradition, Wang was subject to imagined deaths under the pens of
his detractors from 1939 onwards. Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT first instructed its cultural
workers to attack Wang in diverse forms of media following his announcement in late
1939 that he would seek a negotiated peace with Japan. Such attacks were not focused
purely on Wang’s political action. They were, equally, attacks on his person. Muralists
envisaged Wang’s mutilation, or depicted him as a demon (or some other symbol of
death), while textual references to his “trickery” (guibaxi 鬼把戲) suggested a
demonic twist in his behavior.48 Slogans calling for Wang to be “pushed into a grave”
(ba ta tuijin dao fenmu li qu ba! 把他退進到墳墓裡去吧) were written.49 And songs
with titles such as “Beat Wang Jingwei to death” (Da si Wang Jingwei 打死汪精衛)
were distributed.50 In what was almost certainly a strategy to undermineWang’s attempts
to legitimize his decisions on the basis of early revolutionary history, graphic artists such
as Zhang Guangyu張光宇 (1902–65) even depicted Wang as a devil or a ghost haunting
martyrs’ graves in Guangzhou.51 In other cases, Wang was accused of being a jinx to
those around him. Referencing zodiacal and physiognomic beliefs, one 1939 pamphlet
produced by Chiang Kai-shek’s Central News Agency (Zhongyangshe 中央社) went
so far as to suggest that Wang was an “inauspicious” (bu jili 不吉利) individual who
had caused the death of Sun Yat-sen (and others) by sheer physical proximity.52
45See, for example, Zhang Jiangcai,Wang Jingwei xiansheng gengxu mengnan shi lu汪精衛先生庚戌蒙
難史錄 (The true record of Mr Wang Jingwei’s tribulations in 1910) (Nanjing: 1940).
46The story is retold in Edward S. Krebs, “Assassination in the Republican Revolutionary Movement,”
Ch’ing-shi wen-t’i 4.6 (December 1981): 45–80.
47On RNG fears about political assassination, see Joseph Yick, “Communist-puppet Collaboration.”
48The phrase guibaxi (meaning “trickery”, but including the character for ghost) was commonly used to
describe Wang’s behavior in writing critical of him. See, for example, Li San 李三, “Ri kui Wang ni de
guibaxi”日魁汪逆的鬼把戲 (The trickery of Japanese puppet turncoat Wang), Xin Daoli (June 1940): 4.
49KMT Party Archives (Taipei): yi ban 157/21 (KDIR 00255454).
50
“Da si Wang Jingwei” (Beat Wang Jingwei to death), Kang wei jun huakan 1 (March 1939): 2.
51Such images were featured in collections such as Xu Daren徐達人, Wang Jingwei ma Wang Zhaoming
汪精衛罵汪兆銘 (Wang Jingwei curses Wang Zhaoming) (Cunjin Qiao: Lingnan chubanshe, 1939).
52Tong di woguo de Wang Zhaoming (Wang Jingwei, who endangers the country by communicating with
the enemy) (n.p.: 1939), 2–10. KMT Party Archives (Taipei): yiban 496/136 (KDIR 00249715).
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Inadvertently, such attacks contributed to the shape and nature of the state-sponsored
Wang personality cult, and determined how this regime would deal with Wang’s body
and legacy after his actual death. As I have argued elsewhere, expressions of loyalty
to Wang were rarely transformed into immovable “cult products” due to a fear of Resis-
tance and postwar iconoclasm.53 Thus, in contrast to virtually all other personality cults
in modern China, the RNG did not reproduce statues of Wang in public art, or attach his
name to institutions, thoroughfares, or buildings. Indeed, the Wang personality cult as it
developed under occupation was distinguished by its ephemerality. The only exception
to this was Wang Jingwei’s tomb.
A Repub l i c a n b u r i a l
Wang Jingwei died on the afternoon of November 10, 1944, at Nagoya Imperial Univer-
sity Hospital. His death thus occurred two days before the seventy-eighth anniversary of
Sun Yat-sen’s birth (November 12)—one of the most important dates on the crowded
RNG calendar of ritual events. This was almost certainly the most important factor in
determining that news of Wang’s death was not publicly reported in occupied China
until the late afternoon on November 12 (i.e., well after commemorative events
marking Sun’s birthday had concluded).54 Wang’s passing was announced via an
evening broadcast “respectfully informing all compatriots that Chairman Wang had
passed away” (Wei Wang Zhuxi shishi jing gao quanguo tongbao 為汪主席逝世敬告
全國同胞) by the Minister of Publicity, Lin Baisheng林柏生.55
This unplanned coincidence of Wang’s death and Sun’s birth (brought closer together
via the delayed announcement of the former) represented an opportunity for the RNG. To
be sure, humility needed to be observed if the narrative of Wang as loyal disciple of Sun
was to be maintained. Yet the calendrical overlap of the two dates could also suggest a
cosmological connection between the two men. This implied connection would, in turn,
infuse many aspects of the ways in which Wang’s death was discussed and his burial
directed. This included the very meaning of Wang’s and Sun’s respective lives as
these were described by RNG propagandists when news of his death was announced:
“The father of the nation [i.e., Sun Yat-sen],” commenced an RNG Central New
Agency official assessment published to coincide with Wang’s funeral,
was the one and only mentor of the national revolution. ChairmanWang was the one and only
leader who followed the father of the nation. The father of the nation dedicated his life and
strength to the national revolution for 40 years. It has also been 40 years since 1915
(yi mao 乙卯) [sic], when the Chairman dedicated his life to the national revolution until
the moment of his death.56
53Taylor, “Republican Personality Cults,” 682.
54Wen Shaohua聞少華, Cong lieshi dao hanjian: Wang Jingwei zhuan從烈士到漢奸：汪精衛傳 (From
martyr to traitor: A biography of Wang Jingwei) (Hong Kong: Zhonghua Shuju, 2013), 331.
55
“Guanyu Wang Zhuxi shishi jinian guangbo”關於汪主席逝世紀念廣播 (Concerning broadcasts com-
memorating the death of ChairmanWang), Xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao, November 1944. Second Historical
Archives (Nanjing): 2003–1–2033.
56Zhongyangshe中央社, “Xian ci”獻詞 (Words of offering), Jing bao (Nanjing), November 23, 1944. The
reference to “yi mao” (the fifty-second year on the Chinese sexagenary cycle)—which corresponds to the year
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Funerary arrangements were managed by the Political Affairs Committee (Zhongyang
Zhengzhi Weiyuanhui中央政治委員會) of Wang’s KMT in Nanjing, which first met to
discuss the matter on November 16, though accounts suggest that many of the major deci-
sions were directed by committee member and Wang’s widow, Chen Bijun 陳璧君
(1891–1959).57 Prior to this, however, public mourning rites had already been com-
menced upon, with the return ofWang’s corpse to Nanjing on November 13 representing
the start of formal mourning for Wang in the RNG capital, marked by “the laying of his
corpse in a coffin” (dalian dianli 大殮典禮), led by Chen Gongbo 陳公博. This coin-
cided with the public spectacle of Wang’s body being returned to the city by airplane
from Japan, an event which apparently led to significant crowds of onlookers coming
onto the streets, and Nanjing’s main thoroughfares being closed off to traffic.58
Wang’s body did not “lie in state,” in that the public were not permitted to visit the make-
shift funerary hall within the National Government compound which had been set up to
hold Wang’s coffin until a final decision on its fate could be made. Nevertheless, the
rituals presided over by Chen Gongbo on November 13 were indeed reported on in
some detail, with RNG and Japanese news agencies photographing Chen Bijun and
other family members, as they paid their respects in front of Wang’s coffin.59
It remains unclear as to what role the Japanese military or government took in any
plans surrounding public mourning for Wang, as the accessible files in Nanjing today
recount only decisions taken by RNG officials themselves. Indeed it is remarkable
that, with the exception of written condolences from members of the Japanese govern-
ment, and the posthumous award to Wang of the Collar of the Supreme Order of the
Chrysanthemum by Emperor Hirohito,60 so little Japanese symbolism is found in
RNG texts surrounding Wang’s demise.
According to the archival record, it was Chen Bijun who insisted, following the initial
rituals observed on November 13, that musings about a state funeral for Wang—publicly
announced the day following his death—be set aside. Wang’s “laying to rest” (anzang
dianli 安葬典禮), Chen suggested, should instead emphasize the qualities of humility
and self sacrifice that the late leader had apparently embodied when alive. “The regal
practices of the feudal times of old were something that the Chairman [i.e., Wang] had
always loathed,” wrote bureaucrats at the Ministry of Publicity. How could an ostenta-
tious state funeral be appropriate for someone who thought only of the people?61
1915—is almost certainly a mistake in this text. I suspect the author confused this with yi si, or forty-second year
on this cycle, which correspondswith 1905, the year in whichWang is reported to have joined the Tongmenghui
同盟會.
57According to Zhu Zijia朱子家,Wang zhengquan de kaichang yu shouchang (shang)汪政權的開場與收
場 (上) (The beginning and end of the Wang regime, Part I) (Taipei: Fengyun shidai, 2012), 408–9.
58Zhu, Wang zhengquan, 408–9.
59
“Chen dai zhuxi jiwen”陳代主席祭文 (Oration by the temporary Chairman Chen), Changjiang huakan
4.1 (January 1945): no page numbers.
60
“Ri Tianhuang zangWang gu zhuxi zui gao rongyu juhua zhangjingshi”日天皇贈汪故主席最高榮譽菊
花章頸飾 (The Japanese emperor presents the late Chairman Wang Jingwei with the highest honor, the Collar
of the Grand Order of the Chrysanthemum), Jing bao, November 13, 1944.
61Shishi tongxun: Jing’aiWang Zhuxi時事通訊：敬愛汪主席 (Topical news:Mourning ChairmanWang)
(Nanjing: Zhongyang dianxunshe, 1944), 9.
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Rhetorically, such an approach was in keeping with the image that propagandists had
promoted of Wang since 1939. In death, as in life, Wang had embraced martyrdom.
Indeed, in the RNG press, the dominant narrative that emerged was that this event had
a direct connection with Wang’s failed plot to assassinate Zai Feng in 1910—i.e., the
martyrdom he had almost achieved over three decades earlier.62 In committing himself
to such an act, RNG journalists argued, Wang had shown that even as a young man he
had not feared the death he eventually achieved in 1944.63
Practically, however, the decision not to hold a state funeral for Wang (and to under-
take a more ambiguous “laying to rest” instead) had a number of implications. It meant,
for instance, that Wang’s body would not lie in state or be visible to mourners, thus
extending the invisibility of Wang (alive or dead) that had been imposed since his oper-
ation in early 1944. It would also mean that the funeral would be more austere than those
which had immediately preceded it. For example, the state funeral held in August 1943
for the Chairman of the (non-RNG) National Government in Chongqing, Lin Sen林森
(1868–1943), had involved the cessation of commercial entertainment in “Free China”
for an entire month.64 In contrast, film showings, celebrations, and sporting events
ceased for only seven days following Wang’s death in 1944.65
Though not a state funeral, the burial of Wang on November 23 was nonetheless a
highly choreographed affair. Every facet of the day’s proceedings was accounted for.
This ranged from the behavior of the public in the presence of Wang’s cortège (police
were instructed to ensure that people removed hats and maintained silence as the
funeral procession passed, for example) to the order of official mourners, and even the
color of the horses (i.e., black) which accompanied Wang’s casket along Nanjing’s
streets.66
Surviving footage of the event, in the form of a Dōmei newsreel (now owned by Getty
Images), gives us a unique opportunity to examine the day’s proceedings, as well as the
ways in which events were portrayed by the RNG’s Japanese supporters.67 The day com-
menced at half past six in the morning, in a section of the Great Hall (Litang禮堂) of the
National Government compound. Externally, this had been festooned with a banner upon
which were written the words bohai tongai博海同哀 (all the world is joined in mourn-
ing). Inside, the room was decorated with a photographic portrait of Wang that had been
62See, for example, “Wang Zhuxi shengping jilüe” 汪主席生平紀略 (An account of Chairman Wang’s
life), Zhong bao, November 13, 1944.
63A lengthy biographical article along these lines was published in Zhong bao中報 on November 24, 1944,
under the title “Cong gu zhuxi anzang xiangdao gengxu cishe zheng wang shijian”從故主席安葬想到庚戌刺
攝政王事件 (From the burial of the late Chairman Wang to the 1910 plot to assassinate the Prince Regent).
64A state funeral had been arranged for Lin Sen, the Chongqing Nationalists, head of state, only a year
beforeWang’s death. Despite the fact that Lin was in no way associated with the RNG, his funeral was certainly
known about in the RNG. It is thus highly likely that this event was taken into consideration when plans were
made for Wang’s burial. See “China: The Wishes of Lin Sen,” Time Magazine, August 30, 1943.
65
“Ai wo gu zhuxi anzang” 哀我故主席安葬 (The burial of our lamented late Chairman), Zhong bao,
November 19, 1944; see also “Benzhou yundong bisai tingzhi juxing”本週運動比賽停止舉行 (Sporting com-
petitions to cease this week), Shen bao, November 14, 1944.
66Such details are included in Second Historical Archives (Nanjing): 2003-1-5834.
67The newsreel can be viewed at http://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/video/dignitaries-mourners-and-the-
widow-chen-bijun-are-at-the-news-footage/505940049.
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produced by the Japanese on the occasion of his visit to Tokyo in 1941. It was in this hall
that RNG civilian and military officials, together with Japanese and diplomatic represen-
tatives, bowed in respect beforeWang’s coffin, surrounded by floral wreaths. Outside the
hall, uniformed RNG military personnel waited in formation.
A cortège, “led” (kai dao)開道 by RNG soldiers on horseback bearing National and
Party flags, but including Wang’s widow and other family members dressed in dark
mourning clothes, then took Wang’s flag-draped, horse-drawn casket from government
headquarters, through central Nanjing (and significantly past an RNG-installed bronze
statue of Sun Yat-sen in the city center—an image given particular prominence in the
Dōmei footage) and eventually to the Purple Mountain area. While the hall in which
Wang’s body had been kept prior to the funeral had included a civilian portrait of him
dating from earlier in the war, the cortège carried a far more recent portrait of Wang
which showed him in the uniform of the RNG navy, his hair cropped in amilitary fashion.
While regime claims about crowds of 100,000 are impossible to verify,68 the newsreel
footage (shot from a variety of angles, including elevated locations such as the top of
buildings, presumably as a means of showing the extent of the cortège as it passed
through Nanjing) does suggest significant numbers of organized mourners along the
route, particularly school children and youth groups, but also RNG and Japanese military
groups, as well as large crowds of civilian mourners at the tomb itself.69
On arrival at the burial site, a uniformed Chen Gongbo draped Wang’s coffin with the
Party flag, while members of the procession bowed in respect before tables laden with
fruit and candles, while military officers held ritual objects associated with Wang—a
ceremonial sword, medals—on white cushioned trays before his tomb.
The somberness of Wang’s funeral should not be misconstrued with symbolic paucity,
for the day’s events were designed to send a clear message about Wang’s place in the
history of the Chinese Republic. Despite claiming humility, the RNG managed to
weave into the visual and textual narrative of Wang’s funeral parallels with the burial
of Sun Yat-sen in 1925 (though not, importantly, his second burial in 1929). This
included direct references to Sun in the route which the cortège took (i.e., past the
bronze statue of Sun at Nanjing’s Xinjiekou 新街口) to the frequent use of the Party
flag at almost every stage of the day. Accounts of the funeral published days afterwards
noted the remarkable similarities that events in 1944 shared with the first funeral of Sun in
Beijing in March 1925, for instance. Wang Jingwei had himself been present at Sun’s
1925 funeral—in fact he had been in charge of the funeral committee—and parallels
between the two events were noted by none other than the Japanese journalist Unosuke
Ōta太田宇之助 (1891–1986), a confidant of Sun who had witnessed the 1925 funeral
in person.70 “The feeling that this scene gave us was profound,” wrote Ōta:
68
“Wang gu zhuxi anzang dadian” 汪故主席安葬大典 (The burial of the late Chairman Wang), Chang-
jiang huakan 4.1 (January 1945): no page numbers.
69Which may explain regime claims that “the people of the nation were speechless in their grief.” This
phrase (“guoren zai wuyan de beitong zhong”國人在無言的悲痛中) appears in the RNG sponsored pictorial
Changjiang huakan (January 1945) in an issue dedicated to reports in the funeral.
70Ōta’s account ofWang’s funeral is full of references toWang and his parallels with, or connections to, Sun
Yat-sen. See Ōta Unosuke 太田宇之助, “Ji Wang Zhuxi anzang dianli” 記汪主席安葬大禮 (On Chairman
Wang’s funeral), Zhengzhi yuekan 8.6 (1944): 15–16.
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Chen Bijun, dressed completely in mourning clothes, led the mourners as they walked before
the casket, with other members of the Peace Camp following behind. At that moment I could
not help but recall the scene of Sun Yat-sen’s funeral procession along the streets of
Wangfujing in Beijing twenty-five years earlier. At that time, President Sun’s remains had
been placed atop an unadorned palanquin. I still remember how Chairman Wang [Jingwei]
stood at the head of the line [of palanquin bearers] holding one of the ropes, and directing events.
Tomb s a n d mau s o l e um s
The RNG account did not stop at the funeral itself when trying to highlight links between
Wang and Sun, however. The shadow of Sun could also be felt in the siting of Wang’s
tomb. In scholarship which addresses the plot chosen for Wang’s burial, the point that his
tomb was located in the general vicinity of the Sun mausoleum is often labored.71 What
better evidence could there be of an attempt on Wang’s part to posthumously bask in the
glow of Sun’s glory?
This is misleading, however. Wangwas buried in a plot of land within the wider Purple
Mountain area, but in a specific location within this known as Meihuashan梅花山 (lit.,
Plum Blossom Mount). This was a grand name—deliberately reminiscent, so Wang’s
postwar detractors later claimed, of Huanghuagang in Guangzhou72—given by the
RNG to what was little more than a knoll, a short distance from the Ming tombs and
the Sun mausoleum. Both these existing sites were used as the landmarks around
which directions to Wang’s new tomb were derived.73 “To the side of the Sun Mauso-
leum; in front of the Ming tombs” was how the official RNG record phrased it.74
Again, however, it was prewar precedents which inspired this choice. The plum blos-
soms from which the site derived its name were a late 1920s innovation. As the Nanjing-
based historian Cheng Jie 程杰 has shown, plums were first planted on the slopes of
Purple Mountain in preparation for the reburial of Sun in Nanjing in June 1929. It was
also in 1929 that the plum was designated as the Republic’s national flower (guohua
國花). The planting of plum trees close to the site of Sun’s re-interment thus represented
a Republicanization of the space and flora around Zhongshanling. Importantly, however,
it was only withWang Jingwei’s burial here that the site was rechristenedMeihuashan by
the RNG (a toponym which survives to this day).75
While the siting of this grave was therefore no coincidence in terms of its proximity to
the Sun mausoleum, the message it portrayed was far more subtle than some
71See, for instance, Bunker, Peace Conspiracy, 280.
72The claim is made in “Wang Jingwei sihou miwen”汪精衛死後祕聞 (Posthumous secrets about Wang
Jingwei), Hanjian choushi (February 1945): 28–31. To be sure, the RNG narrative about Huanghuagang did
stress the existence of national flowers (i.e., plum blossoms) at the Guangzhou site, though this did not neces-
sarily mean that Meihuashan was purely derived from Huanghuagang. See Xin Guangzhou gailan新廣州概覽
(The current state of new Guangzhou) (Guangzhou: Guangzhoushi Shehuiju, 1941), 56.
73Maps published to aid mourners in locating Wang’s tomb showed its location vis-à-vis both the Sun
Mausoleum and the Ming tombs. See, for instance, “Yi dai weiren de anzangdi: Meihuashan” 一代偉人的
安葬地：梅花山 (The resting place of a great man of our age: Meihuashan), Zhong bao, November 24, 1944.
74Shishi tongqun, Jing’ai Wang Zhuxi, 9.
75Cheng Jie程杰 , “Minguo shiqi Zhongshan lingyuan meihua fengjing de jianshe yu yanbian”民国时期
中山陵园梅花风景的建设与演变 (The construction and changes to plum blossom scenery in the Sun Yat-sen
Mausoleum area during the Republican era), Nanjing shehui kexue 2 (2011): 151–56.
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interpretations credit it as being. It did not simply place Wang’s corpse near Sun’s
remains, but rather amongst an imagined forest of national symbols, the creation of
which Wang himself had been involved in when seeking to first underline his personal
and ideological closeness to Sun in the 1920s. It also invoked an earlier period in the
Republican project, when Wang had been recognized as a statesman with genuinely
close ties to Sun, and when Sun had maintained close ties with Japan.
Just as significantly, however, the 1944 toponym replaced a long standing name for the
site—the “Grave of the King of Wu.” (Wu Wang fen吳王墳) Indeed, it was this grave
which was specifically mentioned in internal RNG documents when a suitable site for
Wang’s burial was being chosen.76 In transforming a site named after the burial place
of a pre-modern ruler into “Plum Blossom Mount,” the RNG was also hinting at a
connection between Wang and a leader from the Three Kingdoms Period (i.e., the
King ofWu), Sun Quan孫權 (181–252 CE). Sun Quan made for a fitting pre-incarnation
of Wang in the RNG worldview, and there is evidence in the secondary literature that
Wang had indeed hoped to construct a symbolic connection with this figure in choosing
the site of his burial.77 Sun Quan had apparently maintained neutrality while other states
fought around him, and had defeated an attempt at invasion from a northern rival at the
Battle of Red Cliffs. Like Wang, he had relied on his river-based navy for victory at this
event.78 Fortuitously, Sun Quan and Wang also shared an ancestral link to Zhejiang
province.79
Wang was not unusual in trying to conflate his own legend with that of a figure from
antiquity. This was standard practice in Republican statecraft, and it is significant that this
belated interest in Sun Quan came just as Chiang Kai-shek was attempting to link his own
late-wartime persona to that of Wang’s neighbor in death, Ming Taizu 明太祖.80 In
Wang’s case, however, there was something more at stake in making such claims.
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists had spent almost the entire period since 1939 peddling
a narrative about Wang’s parallels with the Song-dynasty statesman Qin Kuai 秦檜
(1090–1155).81 The officially sanctioned practice in unoccupied China of crafting
“kneeling statues” (guixiang跪像) of Wang, upon which civilians would be encouraged
76
“Kuaiyou daidian,” November 17, 1943. In Second Historical Archives (Nanjing): 2003-1-5834.
77Zhou Anqing, for example, claims that Wang had seen similarities between the geopolitical situation of
China in the mid 1940s and the world described in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguo yanyi). See
Zhou Anqing周安庆, “Wang Jingwei shi zenyang guizang Nanjing Meihuashan de” 汪精卫是怎样归葬南
京梅花山的 (How was Wang Jingwei buried on Plum Blossom Mount), Dongfang shoucang 1 (2012):
116–18.
78Though it lies beyond the scope of this paper to explore this further, the navy took pride of place amongst
the RNG armed forces, and a good deal of RNG propaganda focused on the supposed strength of this Yangtze-
headquartered force. It is perhapsmore than coincidence that a portrait ofWang in his naval uniform (rather than
in morning suit or lounge suit, which was a far more common way in which to present Wang under the RNG)
was chosen to accompany his casket to Plum Blossom Mount.
79Rafe de Crespigny,Generals of the South: The Foundation and Early History of the Three Kingdoms State
of Wu (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1990).
80Rebecca Nedostup, “Two Tombs: Thoughts on Zhu Yuanzhang, the Kuomintang, and the Meanings of
National Heroes,” in Long Live the Emperor! Uses of the Ming Founder across Six Centuries of East Asian
History, edited by Sarah Schneewind (Minneapolis: Society for Ming Studies, 2008), esp. 381–83.
81For a typical example of writing which conflated Qin Kuai and Wang, see Li Hanhun 李漢魂, “Yidai
renyao de zuihou guisu” 一代人妖的最後歸宿 (The final fate of a demon of our age), in Wang ni Jingwei
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to spit (in order to express their scorn for Wang in absentia), was designed with this
purpose in mind.82 The most celebrated “kneeling statue” in China prior to the Japanese
invasion had been that dedicated toQinKuai, who had long been presented as the archetypal
traitor in Chinese history.83 During the earlywar years, plans were evenmooted for the erec-
tion of a similar statue of Wang in front of the Sun mausoleum after a future victory against
the Japanese, just as the statue of Qin Kuai had been erected in front of Yue Fei’s tomb in
Hangzhou.84 And throughout non-occupied regions, a variety of such statues were designed
by leading Resistance artists. Xu Fubao徐甫堡 (1912–) published such designs, complete
with instructions on how the statues might be crafted, in periodicals associated with the
National Salvation Cartoon Propaganda Corps (Manhua Xuanchuan dui 漫畫宣傳隊),
for example.85 Through attempts to solidify historical analogies between Sun Quan and
Wang, the RNG may thus have been trying to offset Chongqing’s Qin Kuai allegory.86
Crucially, however, the official narrative about Wang’s death did not present this site
as a permanent resting place. Just as Sun’s lying in state in Beijing in 1925 had been but a
temporary solution until permanent interment in a mausoleum in the capital of a unified
China could be achieved, so too was a burial on Plum Blossom Mount described as a
provisional measure which would satisfy both calls for a suitable burial for Wang and
the narrative about martyrdom and RNG parsimony. In published accounts, Wang’s
apparent desire to be ultimately laid to rest not in Nanjing but in the city of his birth,
Guangzhou, was explicitly mentioned. Indeed, clear instructions about this were given
in the authoritative RNG account published shortly after the burial, which posited that
it was Chairman Wang’s wish that he be buried in Guangzhou with already deceased revo-
lutionary comrades. He had thus already chosen a burial plot below Baiyunshan in Guang-
zhou. In order that the Chairman’s wishes, and the orders of the National Government, be
respected, a temporary burial shall take place on Meihuashan, in front of the Ming tombs
in Nanjing. A state funeral shall be held [in Guangzhou] after full peace is achieved.87
huaxiang汪逆精衛畫像 (Turncoat Wang Jingwei’s likeness) (Fuxing xin cun: Xin jianshe chubanshe, 1940),
46–48.
82
“Tao Wang su jian yundong xuanchuan dagang” 討汪肅奸運動宣傳大綱 (Propaganda outlines for
opposing Wang and traitors), April 1940. KMT Party Archives (Taipei): yiban 155/141 (KDR00254293). In
this document, the advice was that such guixiang would depict both Wang and his wife Chen Bijun, and
that these would be located in front of tombs for the “unnamed hero” (wuming yingxiong無名英雄) in unoc-
cupied China.
83On the Qin Kuai statue in Hangzhou, see Huang Donglan, “Shrines of Yue Fei: Spaces for creation of
public memory,” Chinese Sociology and Anthropology 37.2–3 (2005): 74–112; on a contemporary comparison
between statues of Qin Kuai and Wang, see “Gei xiandai Qin Kuai tiexiang”給現代秦檜鐵像(Iron statues for
the modern-day Qin Kuai), Qiritan 10 (1946): 3.
84
“Wang fufu tiexiang ying jian yu hechu?” 汪夫婦鐵像應建於何處？ (Where should iron statues of
Wang Jingwei and his wife be placed?), Qianshao 1 (1940): 30.
85A full page of such designs, and instructions on their use, can be found in Qingqi Manhua 44 (no date),
held in a collection entitled “Zhong-Ri zhanzheng qijian shishi manhua”中日戰爭期間時事漫畫 (Topical car-
toons from the period of the Sino-Japanese War), Special Collections, East Asia Library, Stanford University.
86This would not be the first attempt it made to do so. Leaflets distributed in 1939 supporting the Peace
Movement (such as those found amongst collections within the British Museum, Japanese Collections:
2006, 0117, 0.1-109) sought to tar Chiang Kai-shek with the same Qin Kuai brush, and thus to liberate
Wang from this comparison.
87Shishi tongxun: Jing’ai Wang Zhuxi, 8–10.
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While the insertion of Guangzhou into burial plans drawn up in the days following
Wang’s death may well have reflected the internal geopolitics of this regime,88 such
plans nonetheless point to an RNG emphasis on Wang’s links to the early Republican
movement. As Wang had been almost martyred in 1910, it was only fitting that, some
three decades later, his body be eventually destined for burial not with so great a
figure as Sun, but with other early Republican martyrs in the city that had been so key
to the birth of the Republican movement. Wang was so selfless, such claims suggested,
that he wished not to be commemorated individually in death, but to be laid next to other
martyrs in a communal grave.89
The template set by SunYat-sen’s two funerals (1925 and 1929) was also obvious in such
instructions. Sun’s body had, of course, not been finally laid to rest in Nanjing until the
Chinese Republic had been nominally unified. In the same way, the RNG would have to
wait until peace was restored and the country unified before Wang Jingwei’s body could
make its final journey from the Nanjing tomb to that of Wang’s fellow Guangzhou martyrs.
The design of Wang’s supposedly temporary grave on Meihuashan was consistent
with this approach. Contrary to a number of frequently cited accounts in the secondary
literature, no “huge new mausoleum was built on top of the Purple and Gold Mountain
just outside Nanjing [sic]” for Wang.90 Indeed, the site was conspicuous for its lack of
public space—photographic, newsreel, and textual records show no adjoining square
or sizeable ritual space—or sheer scale that were so central to the Sun mausoleum’s
design, and which have been replicated in subsequent mausoleums and memorial halls
on either side of the Taiwan Strait in the decades since.
Rather,Wang’s tomb was just that—a tomb (mu墓). Signs which marked the site were
also simple, with the phrase “Wang Jingwei zhi mu”汪精衛之墓 (Wang Jingwei’s tomb)
being used on the entrance to a makeshift wooden structure erected in preparation for the
day of the burial, and carved onto the tomb. The design of the tomb itself, being a circular,
grass-topped mound eight meters wide and four meters high, looked not remotely rem-
iniscent of the Sun mausoleum.91 Instead, it bore a resemblance to tombs constructed in
Nanjing for lesser deceased Republican statesmen, such as Tan Yankai譚延闓 (1880–
1930), as well as tombs of a number of martyrs in Guangzhou.92 In this regard, the RNG
was making through funerary architecture a claim which turns the title of Wen Shaohua’s
聞少華 famous biography of Wang on its head. In death, Wang Jingwei was transformed
from a “traitor” into a “martyr.”93
88As Joseph Yick points out, Guangzhou was essentially controlled by Wang’s wife Chen Bijun (and her
extended family) both before and after Wang’s death. Joseph Yick, “‘Self-serving Collaboration’: The Political
Legacy of ‘MadameWang’ in Guangdong Province, 1940–1945,” American Journal of Chinese Affairs 21.217
(October 2014): 217–34.
89Shishi tongxun: Jing’ai Wang Zhuxi, 8–10.
90This claim about the nature ofWang’s resting place in Nanjing is made inMitter,China’s War with Japan,
357.
91The Central News Agency in Taipei now holds one of the few (and most regularly reproduced) images of
the tomb, taken in 1945. Details about the dimensions of the tomb can be found in ZhouAnqing, “Wang Jingwei
shi zenyang gaizang Nanjing Meihushan de.”
92Zhang Yan 张燕, Nanjing minguo jianzhu yishu 南京民国建筑艺术 (Republican architectural art in
Nanjing) (Nanjing: Jiangsu kexue jishu chubanshe, 2000), 104–5.
93Wen Shaohua, Cong lieshi dao hanjian.
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Wang ’ s p o s t h umou s s p i r i t—‘ und y i n g ’ a n d r e s t l e s s
The slogan “Wang Jingwei jingshen busi” (Wang Jingwei’s esprit will never die)94 was
employed frequently by the RNGwithin days of Wang’s death, articulated in public tele-
grams of condolence by Japanese officials95 and newspaper headlines alike.96 It would be
easy to dismiss the use of this phrase as an unremarkable attempt to prolong Wang’s
impact beyond his physical death by way of inspiring rhetoric, yet the phrase also pro-
vides evidence that the RNG found itself in something of a symbolic conundrum at
the end of 1944. Wang had become synonymous with the regime he headed. Indeed,
so central was he to the “Peace Movement” that there was discussion following his
death of the entire regime collapsing.97 With Wang’s passing, “the spark which kept
the Peace Movement alight was gone,” noted one RNG official retrospectively.98
At the same time, it was clear that the war would soon end with the dissolution of this
regime and the possible prosecution of its leaders. With Wang’s death, therefore, some
way had to be found to manufacture a posthumous significance for Wang which
would not negate his contributions, but which would also not suggest that Wang’s phys-
ical remains (decaying onMeihuashan) represented the regime he had led. Instead, just as
Wang’s (unseen) bodymight one day be added to a communal grave of 1911martyrs (via
reburial in Guangzhou), so too might his ideas and words be fed back into a revolutionary
canon that would live eternally in Sun’s Republic once the war came to an end. Wang’s
youthful body might very well be gone—and in contrast to other modern Chinese leaders
who have died since, the RNG did not so much as discuss the embalmment of their leader
in 1944—but his esprit (jingshen精神), articulated in words, and reproduced in ephem-
eral media such as broadcasts and poetry, could be carried on indefinitely.99 State-spon-
sored instructions on how best to mourn this late leader said as much, while hinting as
always at the Sunist legacy that had been the bedrock of the Wang wartime cult. The
best way to “console the Chairman’s soul in heaven” (weijie zhuxi zai tian zhi ling 慰
藉主席在天之靈) was to “work together to renew the achievements of the government
and realize the people’s livelihood (minsheng民生).”100
Officially, the RNG did not try to attach any overtly supernatural elements to news of
Wang’s passing. Indeed, I would argue that the official narrative constructed around
94I have chosen to translate the term “jingshen”精神 here as esprit rather than “spirit” so as to avoid ref-
erences to the supernatural or ghostly understanding of the word “spirit” in English (which is not replicated in
the Chinese “jingshen”).
95
“Zhuxi jingshen busi”主席精神不死 (The Chairman’s esprit will never die), Zhong bao, November 13,
1944.
96
“Wang gu zhuxi jingshen busi!”汪故主席精神不死 (The late Chairman Wang’s esprit will never die!),
Jiangsu ribao, November 24, 1944.
97Yang Zhi揚之, “Wang Zhuxi shishi yihou”汪主席逝世以後 (After Chairman Wang has passed away),
Qingshaonian 5.3 (1944): 3; see also “Wang Zhuxi shishi hou de wenti” 汪主席逝世之後的問題 (The
problem of what happens after Chairman Wang’s death), Sanliujiu huabao 30.6 (1944).
98Chan Cheong-Choo, Memoirs of a Citizen of Early XX Century China (1978), 133–34.
99Two new collections ofWang’s speeches (Wang Zhuxi yanlun zhengji汪主席言論正集 andWang Zhuxi
yanlun xuji汪主席言論續集) were published by theMinistry of Publicity in January 1945, for example. Xuan-
chuanbu gongzuo baogao, January 1945. Second Historical Archives (Nanjing): 2003-1-2032.
100
“Dao Wang Zhuxi shishi” 悼汪主席逝世 (Lamenting Chairman Wang’s death), Shenbao yuekan 11
(1944): 1.
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Wang’s 1944 death by his own regime was unusual in its secularity. To be sure, the
candles and fruit that were laid out before Wang’s casket atop Meihuashan betrayed
the same eclectic mix of religious and state worship that had defined the burials of
Sun Yat-sen. However, in refusing to encourage or distribute stories about the death
and burial of Wang which included overtly supernatural elements, the RNG proved to
be far truer to its secular claims than some other twentieth century Chinese regimes.
No tales of unusual meteorological activity are reported as having accompanied news
of Wang’s passing in 1944 (as they later did in accounts of Chiang Kai-shek’s death
in Taipei in 1975, for example).101 Nothing comparable to the 1976 Tangshan earthquake
was felt in 1944 in Nanjing.102
This does not mean, however, that Wang’s posthumous fate escaped spiritual treat-
ment. Wang’s tomb was destroyed with explosives in early 1946 under the orders of
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist military upon their return to Nanjing. His body was
burned, and his ashes were subsequently scattered. No public ritual accompanied this
series of events, and no photographic records of it exist. Anti-Wang accounts of this
episode suggest that this was done to satisfy public demand, though following the end
of the war, there is little evidence to suggest that Wang’s tomb was subject to widespread
vandalism by members of the public.103
The fact that the destruction of Wang’s tomb occurred secretly meant that the trium-
phant Chongqing Nationalists could successfully purge the landscape of Wang
without reminding the local populace of Wang’s existence. However, the lack of a
visual record of this event, and the lack of a visible body after it, also gave rise to a
number of stories which drew freely from the Resistance canon of Wang defamation,
much of it, as we have seen, inspired by the range of popular beliefs the KMT had
once denounced as “superstition.” Just as the Chongqing Nationalists had resorted to
popular religion in their trolling ofWang in 1939, they returned to such practices in defil-
ing Wang posthumously. For instance, the trope of Wang being so inauspicious as to
bring death upon those physically near him was revived in the Hanjian choushi 漢奸
醜史 (Hideous Histories of Traitors) pamphlets, published in significant number from
1945 onwards. In one account found therein, an unspecified official who had followed
the funeral procession from its very beginning in 1944 was said to have started bleeding
uncontrollably a day after Wang’s burial, and to have died shortly thereafter.104 In other
accounts, it was the earth itself which suffered for Wang’s presence. One theme was that
of animist reactions from the landscape against Wang’s corpse. The plum blossoms on
Meihuashan, for instance, were said to have wept after being defiled by Wang’s
101Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China (Cambridge,
Mass.: The Belknap Press, 2009), 585.
102On popular beliefs (and official encouragement of them) that the Tangshan earthquake was cosmologi-
cally connected to the death of Mao Zedong in the PRC, see Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in
the Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 333.
103Howard L. Boorman, “Wang Ching-wei: China’s romantic radical, ” Political Science Quarterly 79.4
(1964): 504–25. On the postwar public mood in the Yangtze River Delta region towards Wang, see Charles
Musgrove, “Cheering the Traitor: The Postwar Trial of Chen Bijun, April 1946,” Twentieth Century China
30.2 (2005): 3–27.
104Hanjian choushi (February 1945): 28–31.
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body.105 Similar tropes can be found in claims about the “soul of the mountain” (shan
ling山靈) in Meihuashan “complaining about the injustice” (jiaoqu 叫屈) of having
such a corpse buried within its earth.106 In other cases, the RNG notion of Wang’s
esprit never dying was turned on its head by his opponents, for anti-Wang authors
took pleasure in imagining a quite different fate for Wang in the afterlife. One 1946
account in Shanghai’s tabloid press imagined Wang’s soul being attacked by Sun Yat-
sen after death, seeking succor with the Japanese but also being rejected by his former
masters, and eventually floating away aimlessly, without a proper place of rest, for
eternity.107
Con c l u s i o n : T owa r d s a c ompa r a t i v e h i s t o r y o f Ch i n e s e “ d e a d l e a d e r s ”
In an under-cited article from 1985, the late Frederic Wakeman, Jr., provides us with
what remains one of the only in-depth scholarly comparisons of the burials of Sun
Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao Zedong. Wakeman stresses the difficulty that
modern Chinese governments of diverse political stripes have all faced in trying to
balance posthumous reverence for “great men” with fears about how best to manage
the long-term fates of their physical remains, and control residual elements of popular
religion—which, despite over a century of nominally secular government in China,
remain an important element of state rituals surrounding deceased leaders.108 Indeed,
the details of the funerals which form the basis of Wakeman’s study support Rebecca
Nedostup’s key argument about the attempted replacement of popular religion with
statist nationalism from the early twentieth century onwards, and the articulation of
this in the nominally secular funerary rites performed in the service of posthumous
leaders and martyrs by various groups in modern China.109
While there have been a number of convincing studies of specific sites associated with
the very leaders examined by Wakeman in the years since his study first appeared, few
have taken up the methodological challenge posed by his paper.110 Analyses of mauso-
leums, funerary rites, and posthumous hagiography often tend to be written from the per-
spective of discrete regimes or periods rather than as a response to wider questions about
posterity, political culture, and—to reference Nedostup—political religion in modern
China.
As I hope to have shown above, Wang Jingwei’s burial looks remarkably familiar to
those of us who study the modern Chinese past. This is hardly surprising, as so many of
105
“Wang ni Jingwei de fenmu”汪逆精衛的墳墓 (Wang Jingwei’s tomb), Haijing 2 (1946).
106
“Wang ni fenmu zhahui mimi” 汪逆墳墓炸毀秘密 (The secret behind the destruction of Turncoat
Wang’s tomb), Xianghai huabao, May 27, 1946.
107Da Kuang大狂, “Wang Jingwei fendun tou beijue”汪精衛墳墩頭被掘 (Wang Jingwei’s burial mound
has been dug up), Xin Shanghai 9 (1946): 9.
108Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “Revolutionary Rites: The Remains of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung,”
Representations 10 (Spring, 1985): 146–93.
109Nedostup, Superstitious Regimes.
110Although Rudolph Wagner’s reading of the Mao mausoleum comes close. See Rudolph G. Wagner,
“Reading the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall in Peking: The Tribulation of the Implied Pilgrim,” in Pilgrims
and Sacred Sites in China, edited Susan Naquin and Chün-fang Yü (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1992), 378–423.
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the formalities around it borrowed unashamedly from the Sun Yat-sen model. By think-
ing not simply back into the Republican past, but looking also into developments in com-
parable burials after Wang’s demise, however, we might also note just how typical
Wang’s death was in the twentieth-century story of (to borrow Wakeman’s recurrent
term) China’s “dead leaders.” The parallels between the narratives constructed around
Wang’s death and burial in 1944, and those of his enemy Chiang Kai-shek three
decades later—an event which, extraordinarily, has yet to be analyzed in the scholarly
literature in any depth—are striking. Both men, of course, put veneration of Sun at the
center of their respective personality cults, in life as well as in death.111 Both men
were also subject to imagined deaths, and cursed in ways that borrowed heavily from
“superstitious” traditions, by their supposedly secular enemies. Most importantly,
however, just as Wang’s body was buried in Nanjing in 1944 with the proviso that it
would be reinterred in Guangzhou following the reunification of China, Chiang Kai-
shek’s corpse still lies in rural Taiwan to this day awaiting repatriation to Nanjing at
some eternally hypothetical future date when Sun’s Republic is restored on the mainland.
In this regard, a suspension of what might be termed the “collaborationist lens” can
enable to us to move beyond the reductionist assumption that Wang the “traitor” was
different from Chiang the exile. Indeed, the RNG’s internal debates on how best to com-
memorate Wang in the days immediately following his death (e.g., by state funeral as
opposed to a “laying to rest”), predict similar internal debates both in Taipei in 1975,
and in the People’s Republic in 1976.112
Nonetheless, the unique exigencies of wartime occupation did shape the RNG’s man-
agement of Wang’s death, remains, and legacy, and cannot be ignored. It is precisely this
context, however, which highlights a key aspect of the fate of “dead leaders,” for it
exposes the anxiety that all regimes feel about their long-term ability to manage posthu-
mous narratives. We need to be careful about reading too much into the archival record
that the RNG has left to posterity, and which is now becoming accessible to researchers in
China and elsewhere. The appeals to Wang’s apparent selflessness, and mystical refer-
ences to early Republican revolutionary heroics, found in so much late-RNGwriting pub-
lished immediately after Wang’s demise, suggest that the regime’s scribes were already
trying to justify their veneration of Wang in terms which postwar Chinese readers might
appreciate.113 Analyzed critically, however, it is equally clear that RNG hagiography was
a highly defensive genre, manufactured primarily to defend Wang’s political choices in
1939, while drawing on elements of the Republican political tradition (especially that
emerging out of the Sun cult) to promote the personal legitimacy ofWang as head of gov-
ernment. In anticipation of death by assassination, execution, or ill health, the RNG
turned to Republican notions of martyrdom when lauding a leader who carried in his
fragile body an assassin’s bullet, and the scars of other near-death experiences. Occupa-
tion turned martyrdom into the preferred trope of RNG literature about Wang, and even-
tually shaped even the rhetorical arguments justifying a tomb rather than a mausoleum, as
well as the nature of Wang’s funeral. In building a posthumous personality cult around
111Jeremy E. Taylor, “The Production of the Chiang Kai-shek Personality Cult, 1929–1975,” The China
Quarterly 185 (2006): 96–110.
112On this, see Wagner, “Reading the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall.”
113I thank one of the reviewers of this article for pointing this out to me.
From Traitor to Martyr 21
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/j
ch
.2
01
7.
43
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f N
ot
tin
gh
am
, o
n 
17
 A
pr
 2
01
8 
at
 0
8:
52
:2
2,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
Wang which included so little of physical permanence, and focused posthumously on his
“undying esprit,” the RNG thus brings into sharp relief the very same challenges that
have faced many modern Chinese regimes since the 1940s—but also the very different
responses that such regimes turn to in specific circumstances.
Despite being largely left out of the public discourse surrounding the anniversary of
the war’s end in 2015, the RNG is only now beginning to speak to us in ways that we
might not have hitherto imagined or expected. Given the rich range of commemorations
and anniversaries that this regime itself tried to sustain in wartime China, it would be
remiss not to start taking it more seriously as an object of historical analysis. To do so
would not involve defending the choices made by Wang in 1939, but would acknowl-
edge the historical value in trying to understand the political culture which developed
in occupied China thereafter.
22 Jeremy E. Taylor
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